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Wives’ Part‐time Employment and Marital Stability

in Great Britain, West Germany and the United States

Abstract 
Many hail wives’ part‐time employment as a work‐family balance strategy, but theories 
offer competing predictions as to the effects of wives’ employment on relationship stability. 
We use panel data to test these competing hypotheses among recent cohorts of first‐
married couples in Great Britain, West Germany and the United States. We find effects of 
wives’ employment on marital stability vary across the countries. In West Germany with its 
high‐quality part‐time employment, couples where the wife works part‐time are 
significantly more stable. In the more liberal British and US labour markets, neither wives’ 
part‐ nor full‐time employment significantly alters divorce risk. In the United States, 
however, mothers working part‐time have significantly lower divorce risk. West German and 
British husbands’ unemployment proves more detrimental to marital stability than wives’ 
employment. These results highlight the importance of the socioeconomic context in 
structuring the optimal employment participation of both partners. 
Key words: divorce, international comparisons, longitudinal analysis, women’s employment, 
work‐family balance 
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Wives’ Part‐time Employment and Marital Stability

in Great Britain, West Germany and the United States

Introduction 
Some governments promote wives’1 part‐time employment as a work‐family balance 
strategy (Fagan and Walthery, 2007; Plantenga and Remery, 2006). Yet part‐time 
employment frequently offers inferior wages (Gornick and Jacobs, 1996; McGinnity and 
McManus, 2007), limited occupational progression (Bardasi and Gornick, 2008; Gash, 2007, 
2008), and limited access to benefits relative to full‐time employment (Connolly and 
Gregory, 2008; O’Reilly and Fagan, 1998). Consequently, wives’ pursuit of part‐time rather 
than full‐time employment narrows but does not eliminate gender economic inequality 
within households (Crompton, 2002; McRae, 2003). This leaves women more economically 
vulnerable than men if the relationship dissolves, perpetuating the greater poverty risk 
found in single‐parent households (Rainwater and Smeeding, 2004). 
This economic vulnerability is all the more problematic because researchers differ in 
the predicted effects of wives’ employment on relationship stability. On one hand, some 
argue wives’ employment increases dissolution risk (Becker et al., 1977; Cherlin, 1992). 
Under this hypothesized scenario, government promotion of wives’ employment might 
reduce the risk of current child poverty (Kamerman et al., 2003), while simultaneously 
increasing the risk of future poverty if the relationship breaks down. On the other hand, the 
inverse relationship consistently found between household income and divorce risk (Conger 
et al., 1990; White, 1990) suggests that wives’ part‐time employment might lend greater 
stability to modern relationships. The debate continues as recent comparative analyses 
found that the direction of the effect of partnered women’s employment on relationship 
stability varied across countries (Liefbroer and Dourleijn, 2006). 
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We synthesize the debates and evidence to argue that the institutional context 
shapes the relative divorce risk associated with wives’ employment. It is not wives’ 
employment per se that affects divorce risk, but whether her level of employment is 
normative to that country context. To explore this assertion, we select three countries with 
varying institutional support for different levels of wives’ employment. In the United States, 
married women are more likely to be employed full‐time than in many other countries and 
part‐time work is generally poorly paid with no benefits (Kalleberg et al., 2000). West 
German and British policies supported a modified male breadwinner model, with part‐time 
work taken up by a sizeable proportion of employed wives. Yet West German ordinary part‐
time employment provides relatively good wages and access to benefits (Drobnič et al., 
1999), whereas British part‐time employment is more precarious and poorly paid (McKnight 
et al., 1998). We use national panel data to compare the effects of different levels of wives’ 
employment on marital stability across these differing employment contexts. 
Competing Theories of Marital Stability 
Each partner’s employment level is not the only factor affecting work‐family balance, or 
necessarily the major factor predicting marital quality and divorce risk (Conger et al., 1990; 
Johnson and Booth, 1998; Previti and Amato, 2003). Yet in their discussion of work‐family 
balance, Jacobs and Gerson (2004) argued that long work hours in dual‐earner households 
might create tensions that disrupt marriage. Similarly, Cherlin (1992) argued that wives with 
an independent income have less incentive to work out marital problems. These 
perspectives yield what has become known as the independence hypothesis, wherein a 
wife’s employment is predicted to increase the risk of divorce (Becker et al., 1977). 
Independence effects are tacitly assumed universal and linear: In all countries we should 
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observe the smallest divorce risk among couples where the wife remains out of the labour 
force, a somewhat greater risk among couples where she works part‐time, and the greatest 
risk among full‐time dual‐earner couples. 
Oppenheimer (1997), however, noted that a gendered division of paid and unpaid 
labour within the family is a high‐risk strategy leaving households vulnerable to economic 
downturns. It relies on men earning a “family wage” in stable employment, which is less 
likely in post‐industrial economies (Blossfeld et al., 2006; Daly and Valetta, 2006; Machin, 
1996). In today’s more uncertain labour markets, wives’ employment represents a source of 
family economic security. Greater financial security reduces the economic problems 
associated with marital instability (Conger et al., 1990; White, 1990). We term this the 
flexibility hypothesis, wherein wives’ employment over more recent time periods should 
predict greater marital stability. 
The cross‐national empirical evidence has been as mixed as the theories. Studies 
assessing the independence hypothesis with relative earnings found that couples were less 
stable when wives earned more than their husbands in Finland (Jalovaara, 2003), Norway 
(Hansen, 2005; Lyngstad, 2006), Sweden (Henz and Jonsson, 2003), the United Kingdom 
(Chan and Halpin, 2002), and West Germany and the United States (Cooke, 2006). Yet a 
measure of wives’ relative earnings masks other effects that may be the causal factors, such 
as husbands’ under‐ or unemployment. Finnish (Jalovaara, 2001) and Norwegian (Hansen, 
2005) couples where either the man or woman were unemployed had a greater risk of 
dissolution. In a world of dual‐earner families, models should control for the employment 
status of both partners when assessing marital outcomes. 
A measure of wives’ relative earnings also combines possibly competing effects of 
wages and work hours. The income from wives’ earnings might be welcomed by households 
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(Oppenheimer, 1997), whereas her long work hours in a dual‐earner household might 
create tensions that disrupt the marriage (Jacobs and Gerson, 2004; White, 1990). These 
competing factors underscore the need to include separate measures of wives’ employment 
hours and earnings. 
Recent cross‐national longitudinal analyses also suggest individual effects vary in 
context (Cooke, 2006). Using the United Nations Family and Fertility Surveys, Liefbroer and 
Dourleijn (2006) found a partnered woman’s employment (defined as being employed as 
compared with being out of the labour force) significantly increased the risk of dissolution 
among couples in Austria, Finland, Italy, Lithuania, Poland and West Germany; decreased 
dissolution risk in France and Latvia; and had no significant effect in the Czech Republic, East 
Germany, Flanders, Hungary, Norway, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden. 
The country differences in the magnitude, direction and significance levels of 
individual effects suggest the socioeconomic context of female employment structures 
relationship stability. Countries differ in the rate of female labour force participation, as well 
as wives’ average employment hours and relative wages (OECD, 2009). We put forward that 
what proves disruptive to marital stability is not an individual wife’s employment per se, but 
when her employment hours differ from the norm of the society. A normative argument 
has been found to explain some of the cross‐national variation in other individual risk 
factors, such as cohabitation (Liefbroer and Dourleijn, 2006; Wagner and Weiß, 2006), 
women’s greater educational attainment (Härkönen and Dronkers, 2006), and parental 
divorce (Lyngstad, 2006). As the incidence of each becomes more prevalent in a society, the 
associated individual‐level effect on divorce risk attenuates. 
Similarly, as more wives across societies remain in employment, wives’ employment 
becomes more normative and the divorce risk associated with it should attenuate. A 
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normative argument further suggests that as wives’ employment becomes the norm, those 
couples where the wife remains out of the labour force should face a greater risk of divorce. 
Married women’s normative employment levels vary across countries, and so, too, should 
the effect of this employment on dissolution risk. To test this assertion, we select three 
countries that differ in how policy has structured wives’ normative levels of employment: 
Great Britain, West Germany and the United States. 
Wives’ Employment in Context 
Great Britain 
William Beveridge, architect of the British welfare state, declared married women’s unpaid 
care work was vital to the family and the nation (Beveridge, 1942: 50). Initial maternity 
entitlements were generous, but employed wives’ work‐related entitlements were less than 
men’s and single women’s (Land, 1976). Until 1977, employed wives could opt out of 
paying social insurance contributions and forego benefit entitlement, a strategy pursued by 
the vast majority of working wives (Pascall, 1997). This policy support for a male 
breadwinner model, however, did not go so far as to ensure British men earned family 
wages. By the 1970s, three times as many two‐parent families would have been poor had 
they relied solely on the father’s full‐time employment (Land, 1976). 
In addition to having inferior work‐related welfare entitlements, British wives also 
became over‐represented in inferior jobs that proliferated after World War II (Dex and 
Shaw, 1986). Until 1999, employers were not required to pay social security contributions 
for employees whose weekly take home pay was lower than a Lower Earnings Limit. This 
policy made it less expensive for employers to offer several low‐wage jobs of less than 15 
hours per week rather than a full‐time position (McKnight et al., 1998). Even when women 
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work more than 15 hours per week, part‐time jobs are associated with pay penalties (Joshi 
et al., 1999), and women who switch from a full‐time job to a part‐time job often experience 
occupational downgrading (Connolly and Gregory, 2008). Regulations to protect part‐time 
workers were introduced in 2000, but their effect remains unclear. 
Consequently, working part‐time comes at a considerable professional and financial 
cost in Great Britain (Warren, 2004). Not surprisingly, British mothers today increasingly 
pursue full‐time employment (Gregg et al., 2007). New Labour policies, however, continued 
to promote part‐time employment among mothers as a work‐family balance strategy. Only 
two weeks of paternity leave are available to fathers (Jaumotte, 2003). Mothers are 
entitled to 90% of their pay during the first six weeks of their maternity leave, which then 
decreases to a modest flat‐rate benefit. During the period analysed here, mothers were 
entitled to the flat‐rate benefit for 18 weeks, which increased to 26 weeks in 2002. The 
1998 National Childcare Strategy created more than a half million new part‐time, not full‐
time, public childcare places (Eurydice, 2009). In 2003, the single measure introduced to 
promote work‐family balance is for British employers to consider requests for flexible 
employment arrangements seriously (Women and Equality Unit, 2005). As of 2005, 43 per 
cent of employed British women worked part‐time, a slightly smaller percentage than in 
2000 (OECD, 2009). 
West Germany 
After World War II, the compressed West German wage structure enabled more men to 
earn a family wage and support a dependent wife who was legally responsible for the 
domestic sphere (Cooke, 2007). When labour shortages occurred, West Germany relied on 
immigrant guest workers (Trappe, 2000). West German married women’s exit from 
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employment, however, created shortages in occupations such as teaching and nursing that 
were deemed too socially important to be filled by immigrants (von Oertzen, 1999). This led 
to the passage of a 1969 federal reform bill to improve part‐time civil service opportunities 
for women. The bill was amended in 1971 to enable fathers to apply for part‐time civil 
service jobs, but very few did (von Oertzen, 1999). The 1994 Second Act on Equality for Men 
and Women expanded public employees’ right to work part‐time (Töns and Young, 2001). 
This policy support for wives’ part‐time employment does not fundamentally 
challenge the West German male breadwinner model (Ostner, 1993), as other state 
provisions have not expanded to support wives’ equal employment. For example, West 
Germany offers 156 weeks of paid parental leave that is overwhelmingly taken up by 
mothers (Jaumotte, 2003). Public childcare is available for only 19 of every 1000 children 
aged 0 to 3, as compared with 311 places per 1000 children in East Germany (Cooke, 2007: 
939). Employed single mothers receive tax allowances for childcare costs, whereas 
employed married mothers only gain the same right if the husband is sick, disabled and 
unable to work (Drobnič et al., 1999). 
Nonetheless, a large proportion of part‐time jobs in West Germany are professional 
public‐sector positions that do not marginalize workers. West German women who work 
part‐time also have a statutory right to proportional pay and other allowances related to 
working time (Drobnič et al., 1999). As a result, most West German part‐time jobs do not 
incur the same wage penalty as British and US part‐time work (McGinnity and McManus, 
2007). As of 2005, a similar percentage of employed West German women worked part‐
time as in Great Britain (44 per cent), but this reflected an increase of six percentage points 
from 2000 (OECD, 2009). 
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United States 
The United States has the most liberal labour market of the three countries and a system of 
corporate rather than state welfare provision (Kalleberg et al., 2000). A corporate welfare 
system draws more people into employment in order to be eligible for medical, disability 
and other benefits. Some supports for women’s employment are included in corporate 
welfare. For example, the 1978 Pregnancy Discrimination Act required all employers with 
sickness and disability policies to include pregnancy within them. It was not until 1993, 
however, that all US parents were entitled to 12 weeks of unpaid parental leave, the least 
generous leave provisions among the OECD countries (Jaumotte, 2003: 31). 
In the context of corporate welfare, US wives’ part‐time employment remains less 
desirable. It is more uncertain, pays lower wages, and frequently carries no disability 
program, health insurance or pension (Kalleberg et al., 2000). Of the three countries 
analyzed here, part‐time work extracts a particularly high penalty in the United States 
(McGinnity and McManus, 2007). Using Luxembourg Income Study data, Bardasi and 
Gornick (2008: 45) calculated that the part‐time wage penalty as of the mid‐1990s was 22% 
in the United States, as compared with 15% in Great Britain, and just 8% in Germany. Not 
surprisingly, US women’s part‐time employment as a share of women’s employment has 
been declining since the 1960s (Drobnič et al., 1999). In 2005, only one‐quarter of employed 
US women worked part‐time (OECD, 2009). 
Hypothesized Effects of Wives’ Employment on Divorce Risk 
Despite the country differences noted above, about two‐thirds of married women without 
children are employed in all three countries (Luxembourg Income Study Gender Key Figures, 
2009: Table 3i). These similar percentages indicate that dual‐earner, not male breadwinner 
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couples are now the norm. Our normative argument therefore leads to the first prediction 
that negates the independence hypothesis: Couples where wives remain out of the labour 
force will not have a lower risk of divorce in any of the countries. 
The normative context in each country diverges after wives give birth. British and 
West German mothers remain out of the labour market for longer periods of time following 
a birth and then are more likely to take up part‐time rather than full‐time employment 
(Aisenbrey et al., 2009; Gregg et al., 2007). In 2000, more than 45% of British and German 
mothers with one child worked part‐time, as compared with just 16% of similar US mothers 
(OECD, 2002: 78). Almost two‐thirds of British and German mothers with two or more 
children worked part‐time, as compared with less than one‐quarter of US mothers with two 
or more children (OECD, 2002: 78). 
Under a normative argument, we predict that British and German couples where 
wives and mothers work part‐time should be the most stable in those countries. But the 
nature of employment imparts its own risks. Good quality employment can improve 
workers’ well‐being (Author G), enhance marriage quality and reduce instability (Conger et 
al., 1990). In contrast, low wages or irregular work hours disrupt family schedules and might 
increase marital instability. Other than wages we have no direct measures of employment 
quality, but given the higher quality of West German part‐time employment, its predicted 
positive effect on marital stability might be of greater magnitude than in Great Britain. 
US wives, in contrast, are more likely to take short leaves following a birth and return 
to full‐ rather than part‐time employment (Aisenbrey et al., 2009; Han et al., 2008). This 
suggests that wives’ and mothers’ full‐time employment is more normative in the United 
States than in the other two countries. Under a normative argument, US couples where the 
wife is employed should be significantly more stable than male breadwinner couples. Yet 
11 
the United States also has a long work‐hours culture that leads to more time pressures 
among dual‐earner couples (Jacobs and Gerson, 2004). Jacobs and Gornick (2002: 175) 
reported that 12 per cent of US dual‐earner couples worked more than 100 hours per week. 
Data from the 1997 National Study of the Changing Workforce revealed that US women and 
men working full‐time would both prefer to work between nine and 10 fewer hours per 
week (Jacobs and Gerson, 2004: 64). Han and her colleagues (2008) found that US mothers 
with greater resources take more time off following a birth, despite the career penalties for 
doing so. This evidence suggests that even if US wives’ full‐time employment is normative, 
couple stability might be enhanced if mothers, and hypothetically fathers, spend fewer 
hours in employment. 
Methods 
Event history analysis of longitudinal data is the most suitable method for assessing the 
impact of time‐varying characteristics such as wives’ employment hours on risk of divorce 
(Allison, 1984). We therefore selected the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), German 
SocioEconomic Panel (GSOEP) and the US Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to assess 
our normative hypotheses. The PSID began in 1968 with a representative sample of 4,800 
US families. The GSOEP began in 1984 with a representative sample of 12,290 German‐born 
people in 5,921 West German households. Sampling extended into the former East in 1990, 
but East Germans were excluded from this analysis as that region historically expected and 
supported women’s full‐time employment (Cooke, 2007). The BHPS is the most recent 
panel, beginning in 1991 with a representative sample of 5,500 households covering 10,300 
individuals throughout the United Kingdom. We excluded the Northern Irish sample because 
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of that region’s Catholic restrictions on divorce, so our analyses were limited to Great 
Britain. 
Research across many societies has shown that the maximum risk of divorce occurs 
during the first five years of marriage (Fisher, 1993). We therefore selected only couples for 
whom we had data from the beginning of their marriage. Including all married couples at 
any point in time would have biased results with marriages of longer duration. The national 
panels started in different years, so we selected first‐married couples from slightly different 
time periods. From the German and US datasets, we selected couples marrying for the first 
time between 1985 and 1995. The PSID changed in 1997 to be conducted bi‐annually and 
the core sample was reduced by almost 30 per cent. This created substantial missing data in 
1999 and between waves, so we decided to end the US observation window in 1997. We 
followed West German couples until 2000, slightly longer because the average length of 
marriage is longer than in the United States (OECD, 2007). From the more recent British 
panel, we selected couples marrying between 1992 and 2004 and followed them until 2007. 
The time periods were therefore somewhat staggered, but in all countries we observed 
couples across the 1990s and followed marriages for approximately the same length of 
time. 
We constructed the datasets such that each year of a couple’s marriage was a 
distinct observation, beginning with the first year of marriage. Constructing couple‐years 
automatically incorporated the time‐varying aspects and we used robust standard errors to 
control for any correlation in error terms. These criteria yielded a sample of 666 British, 559 
West German, and 502 US first‐married couples. Once a couple reported divorcing or 
separating for more than one year, they were removed from analysis as they were no longer 
at risk of divorce. We included the longer‐term separated couples because of differences in 
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required waiting periods for divorce, including differences across US states. During the 
observed time periods, 106 British, 201 West German, and 223 US couples separated or 
divorced. Unweighted data were used for the analyses, although substantive effects when 
weighting or not were negligible. 
Factors Affecting Divorce Risk 
We included several time‐varying employment‐related variables to assess the effects of 
wives’ work hours and relative earnings, as well as any effects of husbands’ unemployment. 
We included an indicator variable for when the husband was unemployed or otherwise out 
of the labour market (excluding retirement). The distribution of wives’ employment hours in 
all three countries was bimodal, with sharp peaks at zero and around 40 hours per week, 
and further differences across the rest of the distribution in each of the countries. It is 
unlikely that whatever induces a wife to change from zero employment hours to one hour 
per week is the same as what might lead her to change from 20 to 21 hours, an underlying 
assumption when using a continuous measure. Consequently, we constructed indicator 
variables for wives’ employment hours: One when she worked 30 or fewer hours per week 
(part‐time), and one when she worked more than 30 hours (full‐time), against a referent of 
wives out of the labour force.2 Further differentiating part‐time work into shorter and 
longer hour categories did not alter overall results. 
We also included a measure of a wife’s financial contribution to the household, 
calculated as her earnings as a percent of the couple’s total labour income. We tried other 
measures such as absolute or the log of her hourly wages, but substantive effects proved 
the same once controlling for her work hours. We included the log of total household 
income to control for the family’s overall economic situation. 
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In the panels, participants were interviewed in a given year to ascertain information 
about their lives over the past 12 months. To ensure that causes of divorce were 
differentiated from effects, values of the time‐varying independent variables were lagged by 
one year. Otherwise, if a woman anticipated needing to establish her own household, her 
hours of work or share of household earnings might have increased in the year of divorce, 
leading to the erroneous conclusion that her greater employment or earnings caused the 
transition rather than resulted from it. 
We included an indicator variable for when the couple had children younger than 12 
years of age, against a referent of having no children in the observed marital year 
(Yamaguchi, 1991). Children have been considered a couple investment in marriage that 
predicts lower divorce risk (Becker et al., 1977), but more recent evidence suggests the 
effects of children on divorce risk vary across countries (Böheim and Ermisch, 2001; 
Liefbroer and Dourleijn, 2006). In a second model we included an interaction term for when 
mothers of children younger than 12 were employed part‐time, to assess whether this 
work‐family balance strategy that is frequently supported by policy has beneficial effects on 
marital stability. 
We also included controls for the woman’s age at marriage and indicators for when 
the wife or the husband had completed post‐secondary education. We explored but 
rejected including a control for ethnicity. Although the rate of marital dissolution has 
historically been greater for US Black couples (Ruggles, 1997), an ethnicity measure in the 
US models was not statistically significant and did not alter the effects of the other 
variables, and there were too few ethnic minority couples in the British and German 
samples. Our final control measures were years since marriage along with its square to 
capture the higher divorce risk in the early years of marriage net of other factors. 
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Results 
The descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1. Because couple‐year data were used, the 
displayed averages for the time‐varying variables reflect averages across all the early years 
of marriage, not necessarily the percentage of wives in or out of employment during a given 
year. A little more than one‐third of the first‐married West German wives were employed 
at some point during the observed years of marriage, with most working full‐ rather than 
part‐time. In contrast, 42 per cent of US wives were employed. In the more recent British 
sample, the majority of women reported employment during the marriage. These 
differences from the aggregate employment statistics presented earlier represent the life 
course of the specific samples drawn. These are young couples and more likely to have both 
partners in employment until the birth of the first child, after which wives’ work hours are 
more likely to change. The averages thus reflect the sum of these dynamic changes across 
the early years of marriage and childbearing. 
[TABLE 1 about here] 
Effects of the independent variables on divorce risk are presented as odds ratios in 
Table 2 under two models. Model 1 presents the main effects, whereas Model 2 adds the 
interaction term of wives’ part‐time employment and having children younger than 12. As 
predicted, wives’ employment level had differing effects on marital stability across the three 
countries. In the main effects model (Model 1), couples where wives were out of the labour 
force (the referent) were not significantly more stable in any of the countries. Among 
British and US couples, wives’ employment did not significantly alter divorce risk regardless 
of whether it was part‐ or full‐time. Controlling for work hours, wives’ relative earnings also 
did not significantly alter risk of divorce, as effects were substantively and at best marginally 
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statistically significant. This evidence supports our first hypothesis that the independence 
hypothesis does not hold as wives’ employment has become more normative. 
West German marriages were most stable when the wife worked part‐time, in line 
with the normative prediction. British couples where the wife worked part‐time were 
somewhat less likely to divorce, but the effect did not reach statistical significance. The 
evidence therefore lends only partial support for our second hypothesis that part‐time work 
would reduce divorce risk in both West Germany and Great Britain. At the same time, our 
assertion that these effects would be more pronounced in West Germany is supported. 
The significance of other effects varied across countries. Husbands’ unemployment 
significantly increased the dissolution risk in Great Britain. The direction of this effect was 
similar in West Germany and the United States, but it was not statistically significant. 
Controlling for each partner’s employment, greater household income in West Germany 
significantly reduced dissolution risk. The magnitude of this effect in the United States was 
similar but not statistically significant. Greater household income in British households 
predicted a slightly elevated risk, but not a statistically significant one. Having children 
lowered divorce risk in West Germany and the United States. In Britain, children predicted 
greater instability as found by others (Böheim and Ermisch, 2001; Chan and Halpin, 2002), 
but the effect among these first‐married couples did not reach statistical significance. British 
and US husbands with post‐secondary education had significantly more stable marriages, 
but the effect did not reach statistical significance for West German husbands. Other 
research also found that education effects varied across countries (Härkönen and Dronkers, 
2006). West German and US marriages were at significantly greater risk of dissolution in the 
early years, an effect not found among the more recent British marriages. 
[TABLE 2 about here] 
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The interaction term in Model 2 that indicated mothers who worked part‐time was 
not significant for either West German or British couples, and attenuated the significance of 
the main effect of part‐time employment among West German wives. In contrast, effects of 
the interaction term among US couples were more dramatic. US couples where mothers 
worked part‐time were significantly less likely to divorce than all other couples. At the same 
time, including the interaction term for US mothers altered the main effect of US wives’ 
part‐time employment. US couples without children where the wife worked part‐time were 
significantly more likely to divorce. 
Discussion 
Many governments promote part‐time employment as a means of achieving greater work‐
family balance in industrial societies, but it remains an option taken by women more than 
men (Fagan and Walthery, 2007; Jaumotte, 2003). Consequently, some people question 
whether part‐time work represents a sufficient advance away from a gender hierarchy in 
which women remain economically dependent upon men (Crompton, 2002; McRae, 2003). 
This economic dependency leaves women and their children at greater risk of poverty in the 
event of marital dissolution. Given that wives’ employment more generally has been 
predicted to increase divorce risk (Becker et al., 1977; Cherlin, 1992), policy support for 
wives’ part‐time employment might ultimately be policy support for greater future child 
poverty. Despite these theoretical risks, no one to date has explored the effects of wives’ 
part‐time employment on marital stability. 
Given the diversity in female employment participation across countries, we argued 
the dominant hypotheses are too simplistic for modelling divorce risk among current 
cohorts. We suggested instead that normative levels of wives’ employment determine its 
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impact on marital stability. We used British, West German and US panel data to assess this 
assertion. Within the laissez‐faire US context, both partners in a couple are more likely to 
work full‐time. In contrast, West German and British policies supported wives’ part‐time 
employment of differing quality. Many West German wives can find high‐quality, well‐paid 
part‐time jobs in the public sector. British part‐time employment, in contrast, tends to be 
more precarious and pays lower wages (McGinnity and McManus, 2007). 
We selected recent cohorts of first‐married couples from each country panel and 
followed them for the first 12 to 15 years of marriage when dissolution risk is the greatest. 
In no country did a wife’s employment or relative earnings significantly increase the risk of 
dissolution. This evidence offers general support for the normative argument. In addition, 
West German couples where the wife worked part‐time were significantly more stable than 
other couples, including those where the wife was out of the labour force. The direction of 
effects for part‐time employment was similar in Great Britain, but did not reach statistical 
significance. These two findings lend further support for the normative argument, and also 
suggest the quality of work might be important in structuring effects. Our data provided no 
measures of job quality, so this possibility must be explored in future research. 
Somewhat surprisingly, only in the United States did a mother’s part‐time 
employment predict a lower divorce risk. As noted by Han and her colleagues (2008), the 
option of taking time off following birth is available only to US women with greater 
resources. This suggests another fruitful area for future research would be to explore class 
and other group differences in factors affecting divorce risk. Germany has introduced “mini‐
jobs” for marginal male workers that are similar to British part‐time positions (Wanger, 
2006), indicative of growing class disparity in that economy (Palier and Thelen, 2009). We 
had too few cases over time to explore within‐country effects, just as we had too few 
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husbands working part‐time to study gender differences in effects. These areas of inquiry 
must be left as a priority for future research as suitable data become available within and 
across more countries. 
The significance of other traditional risk factors also differed across the countries, 
suggesting that what helps or hurts modern couples varies in its socioeconomic context. For 
example, husbands’ unemployment proved deleterious in Great Britain, and marginally so in 
West Germany. Over the period observed, these two countries frequently experienced 
higher unemployment rates than the United States (OECD, 2009). In addition, Great Britain 
is unique in that men’s unemployment rate tends to be higher than women’s, with many 
policies introduced over the past decade encouraging female employment to ameliorate the 
family effects of male unemployment (Walby, 2001). Given we found British men’s 
unemployment predicted greater marital instability, this policy might not be an effective 
“fix” for the eroding economic position of some British men. With the current global 
economic circumstances, similar effects might emerge in other countries. A continuing 
theoretical and empirical focus on the family effects of wives’ employment rather than 
household employment not only perpetuates the gender hierarchy, but also obfuscates true 
family dynamics and risks in modern societies. 
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End Notes 
1. The basic dynamics discussed should apply to women in either de jure or de facto 
couples, but as dissolution risk varies depending on legal partnership status (Liefbroer and 
Dourleijn 2006) and our empirical analyses are limited to legally married couples, we refer 
to ‘wives’ throughout the text. 
2. Modelling effects using a continuous measure of wives’ employment hours, controlling 
for wives out of the labour force, would have necessitated different functional forms for 
each country: A simple linear model for West Germany; a quadratic model for Great Britain; 
and a third‐order polynomial for the United States. That the functional form differed 
further supports our contention that the effect of wives’ employment on divorce risk varies 
across the countries. The selected indicator categories captured the same effects in a single 
model that could be applied to all three countries. 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics of married British, West German, and US Couples from first 
year of marriage until separated or censored (standard deviations not reported for 
dichotomous variables) 
WEST GERMANY GREAT BRITAIN UNITED STATES 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Wife works part‐time (<=30) 0.08 0.29 0.15 
Wife works full‐time (> 30) 0.26 0.50 0.27 
Wife with tertiary education 0.09 0.21 0.44 
Husband with tertiary education 0.17 0.23 0.47 
Husband non‐employed 0.11 0.03 0.11 
Children 0.82 0.58 0.66 
Wife’s per cent couple earnings 20.93 28.34 29.61 22.15 32.64 23.91 
Wife’s age at marriage 23.99 3.98 27.41 4.82 23.91 4.37 
Log total household income 10.96 0.83 7.95 0.48 10.45 0.80 
Duration of marriage 8.66 4.04 3.94 3.41 6.88 3.37 
n couple‐years (couples) 4,473 (559) 4174 (666) 2,535 (502) 
Table 2 Relative risk of divorce from year of marriage in Great Britain, West Germany, and the United States 
WEST GERMANY GREAT BRITAIN UNITED STATES 
MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 1 MODEL 2 
Odds Ratio RSE Odds Ratio RSE Odds Ratio RSE Odds Ratio RSE Odds Ratio RSE Odds Ratio RSE 
Wife works part‐time (<=30) 0.57* 0.15 0.50 0.29 0.74 0.27 0.85 0.31 1.38 0.50 3.34** 1.56 
Wife works full‐time (>30) 0.66 0.19 0.66 0.19 0.94 0.45 0.95 0.44 1.04 0.45 1.26 0.53 
Ref: housewife, out of labour force 
Wife’s per cent couple earnings 1.01+ 0.01 1.01+ 0.01 1.01 0.01 1.01 0.01 1.00 0.01 1.00 0.01 
Husband non‐employed 1.47+ 0.34 1.47 0.34 2.74** 0.99 2.73** 1.14 1.71 1.03 1.63 0.95 
Wife with tertiary education 0.59 0.21 0.59 0.21 0.56 0.22 0.56 0.26 1.17 0.29 1.16 0.30 
Husband with tertiary education 0.71 0.17 0.71 0.18 0.40* 0.16 0.40* 0.17 0.39** 0.12 0.39** 0.12 
Children (0 = none) 0.27*** 0.05 0.27*** 0.05 1.18 0.32 1.21 0.34 0.42*** 0.11 0.69 0.20 
Children*women part‐time 1.17 0.72 0.85 0.61 0.24** 0.12 
Log of total household income 0.80*** 0.04 0.80*** 0.04 1.10 0.28 1.10 0.28 0.79 0.12 0.79 0.11 
Wife’s age at marriage 1.00 0.02 1.00 0.02 0.94* 0.02 0.94* 0.03 0.92* 0.04 0.92* 0.04 
Years since marriage 1.24** 0.10 1.24** 0.10 0.96 0.09 0.96 0.09 1.69** 0.29 1.78*** 0.32 
(Years since marriage)2 0.99** 0.01 0.99** 0.01 0.99 0.01 0.99 0.01 0.96* 0.02 0.96** 0.02 
Pseudo log‐likelihood  ‐777.65 ‐777.61  ‐418.18  ‐418.14  ‐357.93  ‐353.33 
Wald chi‐square 96.40*** 96.64*** 33.55*** 33.45*** 56.36*** 61.86*** 
n couple‐years (couples) 4,473 (559) 4,473 (559) 4,174 (666) 4,174 (666) 2,535 (502) 2,535 (502) 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. (two‐tailed tests) 
